In this paper we consider a reinsurance syndicate, assuming that Pareto optimal allocations exist. Under a continuity assumption on preferences, we show that a competitive equilibrium exists and is unique. Our conditions allow for risks that are not bounded, and we show that the most standard models satisfy our set of sufficient conditions, which are thus not too restrictive. Our approach is to transform the analysis from an infinite dimensional to a finite dimensional setting.
I Introduction
We consider the reinsurance syndicate introduced by Borch (1960-62) , a model closely related to the exchange economy studied by Arrow (1954) . Bühlmann (1984) shows that, provided that there are Pareto optimal risk exchanges, an equilibrium exists for bounded risks. While this result may be of interest for practical purposes (since the accumulated wealth in the World is obviously bounded), in modeling contexts this precludes many probability distributions that are of interest, but which may just happen to have unbounded supports.
Bühlmann 's arguments are based on affine contracts, but we shall extend to arbitrary contracts in this paper. We basically swap his assumption of bounded risks and a Lipschitz condition with a continuity requirement on preferences. The latter we demonstrate is satisfied for the most common exchange economies studied within the "finance contexts". Under this condition we demonstrate both existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
When Parto optimal risk exchanges exist, there will be competitive equilibria after a redistribution of the initial endowments X i , i ∈ I := {1, 2, · · · , I}, here a set of random variables referred to as the initial portfolio allocation of the I members of the reinsurance syndicate (by the Second Welfare Theorem). We provide a set of sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium for a given set of initial portfolios X = (X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X I ). Since the set of sufficient conditions for a Pareto optimal exchange to exist are very weak indeed for the model that we consider (see e.g., DuMouchel (1968)), our approach is not restrictive for this reason. In fact, if there are no Pareto optimal contracts, there can not be a competitive equilibrium either, by the First Welfare Theorem.
The existence of equilibrium in infinite dimensional models is, of course, extensively studied in the mathematical economics literature. Bewley (1972) is an early reference of existence in infinite-dimensional spaces, and later this topic has been extensively studied by many authors, including Mas-Colell (1986), Mas-Colell and Zame (1991), Araujo and Monteiro (1989) , and Dana (1993) among others. Uniqueness of equilibrium is a lesser explored subject in infinite dimensional settings.
Our approach will be based to a large extent on "risk theory", which requires us to first define what is meant by a reinsurance syndicate. This essentially enables us to transform problems from the infinite dimensional space of L 2 , to finite dimensional Euclidian space. In Section 2 we present some of the basic properties of such a market. In Section 3 we discuss existence of equilibrium in a reinsurance syndicate, and give the basic existence theorem of the paper. Our exposition rely mainly on the results of Section 2, and a fixed point theorem. Here one can also find several examples, and we prove uniqueness of equilibrium. Section 4 compares our result to a corresponding theorem emerging from a more general theory of an exchange economy, and Section 5 concludes.
II The reinsurance Syndicate
Consider a one-period model of a syndicated market with two time points, zero and one. The initial portfolio allocation of the members is denoted by X = (X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X I ), i.e., the one which realizations would result at time one if no reinsurance exchanges took place. At time zero X is a random vector defined on a probability space (Ω, F, P ) with a probability distribution function F (x) = P [X 1 ≤ x 1 , · · · , X I ≤ x I ]. After reinsurance at time zero the random vector Y = (Y 1 , Y 2 , · · · , Y I ) results, the final portfolio allocation, satisfying i∈I Y i = i∈I X i , since nothing "disappears" or is added in a pure exchange of risks.
One difference between a syndicate and and the general exchange economy of Arrow (1954) is that the variables X i signify economic gains or losses measured in some unit of account, not consumption, which implies that negative values are allowed. When this happens to a member, this person may be interpreted to be bankrupt.
Consider the problem of each member i of the syndicate
for i ∈ I; the members maximize expected utility subject to their budget constraints. Let us call a treaty Y feasible if it satisfies
where by X M we mean the "market portfolio", which is just the aggregate of the initial portfolios of the members. Our definition of equilibrium is: An important feature of this syndicate is that there are no restrictions on contract formation. As a consequence it can be shown that the pricing functional π must be linear and strictly positive if and only if there does not exist any arbitrage (e.g., Aase (2002) ).
We shall restrict attention to initial portfolios X i and sharing
, that involve no arbitrage. Since any (strictly) positive, linear functional on L 2 is also continuous, by the Riesz Representation Theorem there exists a unique random variable ξ ∈ L 2 ++ , the interior of the positive cone of L 2 , such that
Notice that the system is closed by assuming rational expectations. This means that the market clearing price π implied by the members behavior is assumed to be the same as the price functional π on which the members decisions are based. Formally our definition of (strong) Pareto optimality is the following
The following characterization of Pareto optimal allocations is well known:
Proposition 1 Suppose u i are concave and increasing for all i. Then Y is a Pareto optimal allocation if and only if there exists a nonzero vector of member weights λ ∈ R
If the allocation Y is Pareto optimal, then the problem (2) defines a utility function u λ (·) : R → R for this λ, such that
Notice that the existence of the member weights λ is a consequence of the Separating Hyperplane Theorem applied to Euclidian R I . As it turns out, these member weights determine state prices via the marginal utility u λ (X M ) of the representative member computed at the aggregate portfolio X M . Thus, despite of the unfortunate fact that the interior of L 2 + is empty, there is still hope to get supportability of preferred sets via the construction in Proposition 1.
Pareto optimal allocations can be further characterized under the above conditions, the following is known as Borch's Theorem (see e.g., Borch (1960-62) 
):
Proposition 2 A Pareto optimum Y is characterized by the existence of non-negative member weights λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ I and a real function u λ (·) : R → R, such that
Proposition (2) can be proven from Proposition (1) by the Kuhn-Tucker theorem and a variational argument (see e.g., Aase (2002) ). Karl Borch's characterization of a Pareto optimum Y = (Y 1 , Y 2 , · · · , Y I ) simply says that there exist positive "member" weithts λ i such that the marginal utilities at Y of all the members are equal modulo these constants.
Because of the smoothness assumptions of Proposition 1 which we maintain in this paper, both sides of the equations (4) are real, differentiable functions (the right-hand side because of the implicit function theorem), i.e., Y i (·) : B → R and u λ (·) : B → R for some subset B ⊆ R of the reals, so taking derivatives of both sides gives
Dividing the second equation by the first, we obtain the following non-linear differential equation for the Pareto optimal allocation function Y i (x):
where
is the absolute risk aversion function of "the representative member", and
is the absolute risk aversion of member i at the Pareto optimal allocation function Y i (x), i ∈ I.
Since i∈I Y i (x) = 1, we now get by summation in (5) that
as an equality between random variables. This allows us to rewrite the differential equations (5) as follows
In other words, provided Pareto optimal sharing rules exist, we have the following results, which we shall utilize later:
Proposition 3 (a) The risk tolerance of the syndicate ρ λ (X M ) equals the sum of the risk tolerances of the individual members in a Pareto optimum.
(b) The real, Pareto optimal allocation functions Y i (x) : R → R, i ∈ I satisfy the first order, ordinary nonlinear differential equations (7).
(c) The following relationships hold
The result in (a) was found by Borch (1985) ; see also Bühlmann (1980) for the special case of exponential utility functions, and also Gerber (1978) , among others. The result in (c) is contained in Theorem 10 p. 130 in Wilson (1968) . It is well-known that if an equilibrium exists, then the first order necessary and sufficient conditions are given by the equations (4) . If this is the case, then the Riesz representation ξ, also called the state price deflator, is given by ξ = u λ (X M ) a.s. This is our next result:
Assume that π(X i ) > 0 for each i. It seems reasonable that each member of the syndicate is required to bring to the market an initial portfolio of positive value. In this case we have the following (a proof can be found in Aase (2002) 
Here α i are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the problem (1) , and the relation between these and the member weights λ i is seen to be α i = λ
for all i ∈ I.
III Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Will there always exist prices such that the budget constraint all hold with equality? We will now analyze this question for the reinsurance syndicate just descrecibed. The problem of existence of equilibrium in an infinite dimensional setting has been extensively discussed in the literature. Several difficulties are identified, among them that the interior of the orthant L 2 + is empty, so calculus becomes rather difficult. Normally the Separating Hyperplane Theorem guarantees that it will be possible to separate a convex set C from a point x / ∈ C, provided that the interior of C is not empty. Hence, if consumption sets have non-empty interior, then the continuity and convexity of preferences will guarantee that preferred sets can be price supported. As commented after Proposition 1, despite of this difficulty we obtain the member weights by a separation argument, which provides us with state prices via the representative member's marginal utility at X M . It should thus be possible to use this construction to show existence of equilibrium. As it turns out, all we have to do is to make an extra smoothness assumption on preferences. In this section we make this precise by utilizing the results of the previous section to essentially transform the problem from an infinite dimensional to a finite dimensional setting.
To this end we start with the initial portfolios X i , which are supposed to satisfy X i ∈ L 2 , i ∈ I. The final portfolios Y i and the state price deflator ξ are supposed to be in L 2 and L 2 ++ respectively, according to this theory, the latter because L 2 is its own dual space, where the two plusses stems from the absence of arbitrage. However, both the probability distribution of X and the utility functions are exogenously given, and it is not clear at the outset that any choice of these, satisfying X i ∈ L 2 , will have these properties. From the results of the previous section, it follows that
However it is far from clear that
2 , which this theory requires to be internally consistent. That is, will there exist state prices ξ = u λ (X M ) having finite variances such that the budget constraints are all satisfied? These are the problems we now address.
First we notice a few facts about about the existence problem. The state prices u λ (X M ) are determined by the member weights λ, and the budget sets remain unchanged if we multiply all these weights by any positive constant, so each member's demand function
is accordingly homogeneous of degree zero in λ. Hence we can restrict attention to member weights belonging to the (I − 1) dimensional unit simplex
Since we consider a pure exchange economy with strictly increasing utility functions, an equilibrium will exist if there exists some λ ∈ S I−1 such that
where we have chosen to parameterize the optimal allocations Y i (X M ) by the member weights λ. The existence problem may be resolved if one can identify these budget constraints with a continuous function f :
and then employ Brower's fixed-point theorem.
The idea is perhaps best illustrated by a few examples: In the first one the utility functions are negative exponentials.
It is a consequence of Proposition 2 that the Pareto optimal allocations are affine in the aggregate wealth
where the constants a i are the risk tolerances of the members, A = i∈I a i by the result (6), so that A the risk tolerance of the representative member or the syndicate, and b i are zero-sum side-payments, corresponding to
By imposing the normalization E(u λ (X M )) = 1 (corresponding to a zero risk-free interest rate), the budget constraints of the members correspond to the equations
where the zero-sum side-payments b i are given by
Since there is a one to one connection between the member weights λ i and the side-payments b i , the latter could alternatively be used in the fixed-point argument.
The second example is that of constant relative risk aversion: Example 2: Preferences represented by power utility means that Let us assume that the supports of the initial portfolios are (0, ∞), and Y i (x 0 ) = b i for some x 0 > 0. The parameters a i > 0 are the relative risk aversions of the members, here given by positive constants, and we consider the HARA-case where
The marginal utilities of the members are given by u i (x) = x −a , and the Pareto optimal allocations Y λ i are found from Proposition 2 to be
The differential equations (5) for these allocations are
showing that
X M , where b i is member i s share of the market portfolio when the latter takes on the value x 0 , where
Comparing the two versions of the Pareto optimal allocations, we notice that
, again giving a one to one correspondence between the constants b i of the differential equations (5) and the member weights λ i . The member weights λ i are determined by the budget constraints, implying that
or, λ i is determined modulo the proportionality constant
For both these examples we have computed the respective equilibria, where it is understood that the expectations appearing in the expressions for the member weights exist. This must accordingly follow from any set of sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium.
The reason that the existence of the λ i , or, equivalently the b i , is not automatic, is that both the probability distribution of X and the utility functions are given exogenously, as explained in the introduction. Although it is clear that if
2 . This has to be checked separately. While the first order conditions for an optimal exchange of risks do not depend on the probability distribution of the vector X of the initial endowments, clearly the equilibrium allocation Y (λ) does depend on this distribution through the budget constraints, and only if this probability distribution allows for the computation of the moments appearing in the expressions for the member weights λ i , as e.g., in (11) and (15), the relevant equilibrium will stand a chance to exist.
These examples indicate that instead of focusing attention on the member weights λ i , we might as well consider the constants b i of the differential equations (5), and try to associate with the budget constraints a fixed-point for these. This observation turns out to be quite general, and is the line of attack we choose to follow.
A natural condition to impose for the constants b i to exist, might be that all the risks are bounded. Often this is too strong. For example if X is multinormally distributed, and thus possesses unbounded supports, certainly the moments in (12) can still be computed, and are well defined. This is also the case for many other distributions with unbounded supports.
However, even in the case with bounded supports it is not clear that the pricing functional π is continuous. To see this, consider Example 2 with B = (0, 1]. Here the state prices represented by the function u λ (X M
III-A A basic fixed point argument
As observed in the previous section, instead of focusing attention on the member weights λ i (because these determine prices via u λ (X M )), we restrict attention to the constants b i of the differential equations (7). The optimal allocations, now parameterized by b instead of λ, are functions of the aggregate risk X M , i.e., Y 
}.
When the relative risk aversion equals one, the logarithmic utility function is appropriate, i.e., u i (x) = ln(c i
Our basic assumption is that X i ∈ L 2 for all i ∈ I. By Minkowski's inequality also X M ∈ L
2 , but what about the optimal portfolios Y i ? Recall from (6) 
which means that and Y i ∈ L 2 for all i ∈ I as well. Bühlmann's assumptions of finite supports of the X i together with assumption (A1) allowed him to use standard, global results of ordinary, nonlinear differential equations to guarantee that the optimal allocations are continuous in the constants b i . In order to relax this condition, observe that the differential equations given by (7) are indeed very "nice", since the nonlinear functions
satisfiy |F i (y i , x)| ≤ 1 for all i due to (6) . Thus Witner's condition of global existence is satisfied for the differential equations (7) . In this case we do indeed have global existence and uniqueness of solutions for these equations, over the entire region (x, y i ) ∈ R 2 . In order for the solutions Y i (x) to be continuous functions of the constants b i , the following is sufficient:
(A2) The functions F i (y i , x) and
This assumption also replaces (A1). Let us check (A2) for the standard cases. For the negative exponential utility function we can use the domain B of the X i to be all of R = (−∞, ∞), and F i (y i , x) = a i A so the condition is trivially satisfied.
For the power utility function the quantity a i > 0 now means the relative risk aversion of member i, and the function F (y i , x) is given by
where ρ(x) is a smooth function of x, so again (A3) is satisfied and the domain B of the X i can be taken to be B = R ++ = (0, ∞).
For the logarithmic utility function we obtain that
We conclude that the assumption (A2) is not really restrictive, since it does not rule out any of the most common examples.
A closer examination of Assumption (A2) reveals that the only additional requirement it imposes on the preferences of the members is that the third derivative of the utility functions must exist and be continuous. Let us now assume that the moments implied by the budget conditions given in (10) exist. Sufficient for this to be the case is that 
By (16) it follows that |Y
for any b ∈ G by first applying the Schwarz inequality and then Minkowski's inequality. This establishes c ∈ H where H is is a rectangle like G. Let J be the rectangle in R I containing both G and H. Denote the hyperplane 
By our above observation that the optimal allocations Y 
2 , the mapping f is continuous and hence has a fixed-point by Brower's theorem. Therefore there exist b *
and consequently
This completes the proof.
Let us consider some illustrations where Theorem 2 is conclusive, but where the assumption of bounded risks is not satisfied. 
This gives an initial allocation X of dependent portfolios, which seems natural in a realistic model of a reinsurance market. Here it means that the X i portfolios are mixtures of exponential distributions with a fairly arbitrary dependence structure.
In this case X M has a Gamma distribution with parameters I and θ. According to Theorem 2 all we have to check for an equilibrium to exist is that
for some constant K, we have to verify that the following integral is finite:
This is indeed the case, since by the moment generating function of the Gamma distribution it follows that E e Instead of the assumption of the exponential distributions, suppose that the Z i are independent, each with a Pareto distribution, i.e., with probability density function
This is known as the Pareto distribution of the first kind 4 . In this case EZ i exists only if α i > 1, and varZ i exists only if α i > 2, etc. The moment generating functions ϕ i (β) = Ee βZ i of these distributions exist for β ≤ 0, since the random variables e βZ i are then bounded. Carrying out the same construction as above, we notice that
since each of the factors has finite expectation. Accordingly, for these distributions a competitive equilibrium exists by Theorem 2.
Here the X i are mixtures of Pareto distributions, but we should exert some caution, since our theory is developed for risks belonging to L 2 . We are outside this domain regarding the Z i if α i < 2 for some i, in which case X j / ∈ L 2 for any j. However, as long as the initial risks are in L 2 , an equilibrium exists.
Finally consider the normal distribution in this example, and assume that each X i is N (µ i , σ i )-distributed and that X is jointly normal, where cov(X i , X j ) = ρ ij σ i σ j for i, j = 1, 2, · · · , I. By the moment generating function of the normal distribution we have that
Thus an equilibrium exists.
Even if the positivity requirements are not met, still all the computations of the equilibrium are well defined, the state price deflator ξ(X M ) is an element of L 2 ++ , prices can readily be computed, and an equilibrium exists. It may admittedly be unclear what negative wealth should mean in a one period model, but aside from this there are no formal difficulties with this case as long as utility is well defined for all possible values of wealth. In the reinsurance syndicate we usually interpret X i = w i − V i where w i are initial reserves and V i are claims against the ith reinsurer, or member. In this case negative values of X i have meaning, in that when this occurs, reinsurer i is simply bankrupt, or in financial distress.
In the above example with the Pareto distributions, if the parameters α i satisfy 1 < α i < 2 for all i, expectations exist, but not variances. Still
++ as well, which means that this case is now well defined. This is so because our development in Theorem 2 is easily seen to be valid for L 1 replacing L 2 , in fact any L p -space will do, for 1 ≤ p < ∞, with dual space L q , where
∞ is well behaved from the point of view of supporting preferred sets since the positive cone has a non-empty interior, but neither does L 1 furnish all the continuous linear functionals on L ∞ , nor do we know that the strictly positive functionals on L ∞ are continuous. We now turn to the case where the relative risk aversions of all the syndicate members are constants, as in Example 2:
Example 4. Consider the model of Example 2, where
We again restrict attention to the case where
Recall that the weights λ i are determined by the budget constraints, implying that
or, λ i is determined modulo the proportionality constant k = ( j∈I λ 
Regarding existence of equilibrium, according to Theorem 2 it is sufficient to check that u λ (X M ) ∈ L 2 . In this case X M has a Gamma distribution with parameters I and θ, and all we have to check is if the expectation
is finite. The possible convergence problem is seen to occur around zero, and the standard test tells us that when (−2a + I − 1) > −1, or when I > 2a, this integral is finite. Thus, for example if a = 10, then equilibrium exists in this syndicate if the number of members exceeds 20. One may wonder if the member weights λ i can be computed when I > 2a. To check this consider the two expectations E(X 1−a M ) and E(Z i X −a M ). In order to verify that these expectations exist, we have to find the joint distribution of Z i and X M . It is given by the probability density
So we have to check if the integral
is finite. The possible convergence problem is again seen to occur around zero, and the standard test requires that (1 − a + I − 2) > −1, i.e., when I > a this integral is finite. From this it is obvious that the expectations E(X i X −a M ) also converge in the same region, by linearity of expectation, since
Similarly we have to check the following expectation:
Near zero the possible problem again occurs, and the standard comparison test gives convergence when (1 − a + I − 1) > −1, or when I > a − 1. To conclude, when I > max{a, a − 1} = a, both expectations exist, showing that the member weights exist in the parameter range (I > 2a) where state prices are known to exist. Notice that an equilibrium will exist with a fairly low number of participants in the interesting region for the parameter a. Consider e.g., the value a = 1 corresponding to a logarithmic utility function, then an equilibrium exists with only two members in the syndicate. When the relative risk aversion is two, only four members are required, and so on.
Finally consider the case of Pareto distributions for the initial portfolios X i directly, assuming α i > 2 for all i. The integrals
Since min i∈I α i > 0 there are no problems with convergence, and an equilibrium exists in this case regardless of the values of the relative risk aversion parameter a, (a > 0) or its relationship to I, since E(X −2a
). In this latter case all the portfolios are bounded away from zero, which helps with the existence problem for power utility, while the exponential distribution has more probability mass near zero, potentially causing problems with existence in certain parameter ranges, as we have seen above.
The result of this example is in line with the spirit of a competitive equilibrium, which generally implies that the theory may work better the more individuals that participate. Recall that classical economics sought to explain the way markets coordinate the activities of many distinct individuals each acting in their own self-interest.
III-B Uniqueness of Equilibrium
The question of uniqueness of equilibrium is largely unexplored in the infinite dimensional setting. However, given our smoothness assumptions one would expect equilibrium to be unique, provided one exists. In this section we show that this conjecture holds.
Approaches that take preferences and endowments as primitives seem to encounter many difficulties, in addition to the usual difficulty of doing calculus in infinite dimensional spaces. As mentioned before the natural domain of prices is a subset of the dual space of L 2 , the positive orthant L 2 + , but this set has empty interior, which is very inconvenient for doing calculus. In general are excess demand functions typically not defined, and are not smooth even when they are defined. Araujo (1987) argues that excess demand functions can be smooth only if the "commodity" space is a Hilbert space, which is noticed to be the case in our model. Inspired by our approach in Theorem 2, where we basically transformed the infinite dimensional problem into a finite dimensional one represented by the member weights λ, or equivalently, the constants b, we attempt the same line of reasoning regarding the uniqueness question.
Going back to the first order, non-linear differential equations in (7), to each point (
to these equations under the assumption (A2). However, there could be several fixed-points and thus one possible equilibrium associated with each of them.
Arguing in terms of the member weights λ instead of the b's, let us define the individual demands of the I members by Z i . Below we show that these are well defined and smooth functions of the member weights λ i , i ∈ I.
One reason we consider the member weights here instead of the constants b, is due to Proposition 3 (c), equation (8) , where is was shown that the state price ξ(λ) is an increasing function of the weights λ i . As a consequence, by increasing λ i , member i's demand for reinsurance will decrease, since, loosely speaking, this can be associated with a strengthening of member i's initial "reserve" X i , while all the other members' demands will decrease. This will be formalized below.
The excess demand is zero at the possible equilibrium points λ * , corresponding to the points b * of Theorem 2. If the excess demand curve as a function of each member weight λ i is downward sloping for all i at all equilibria where Theorem 2 holds, there can only be one equilibrium. It is enough that Z (λ) is downward sloping in (I − 1) of the λ's because of the normalization of the weights. Because of the smoothness of the excess demand function in λ, this will be a sufficient condition for uniqueness.
By investigating the marginal effect on the excess demand Z λ * from a marginal increase in λ * i , making sure that the resulting λ is still on the simplex S I−1 , we may use this procedure to check for uniqueness. As real functions the demands Z λ i : R → R can be expressed as
where i x i = x, and thus, in the language of calculus, we must therefore consider the quantities
where α is the Lagrange multiplyer associated with the constraint of remaining on the simplex. Since any marginal change in one of the member weights will necessarily bring the resulting vector of weights outside the simplex unless the other weights are correspondingly lowered, α > 0. Thus we compute the following
at any equilibrium point λ * , and check wether all these have the same sign for all x ∈ B.
In order to compute the quantities
, we must find
for all i, j ∈ I. It follows by differentiation of the first order conditions
for all x ∈ B, and using equation (8) , and the first order conditions, we obtain dY
for all x ∈ B. Similarly we get
for all x ∈ B. Notice that
∈ (0, 1) by equation (7), in other words, an increase in the market portfolio leads to an increase in all the members portfolios Y i , and no member assumes the entire increase because they are all risk averse. It follows that
< 0 for all j = i, demonstrating what was explained above for the individual demands.
We are now in position to compute the required marginal changes in excess demand within the simplex. It is
for all x ∈ B, where we have used (18) and (19). Continuing, we get
for all x ∈ B, where we have used that
according to Proposition 3(a). Finally using (7) we observe that
The conclusion is formulated in the following theorem:
Theorem 3 Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, the existing equilibrium in the reinsurance syndicate is unique.
Thus our conjecture is confirmed. Notice that in the examples we have presented we were able to find the equilibrium by direct calculation, and the weights λ i were uniquely determined (modulo multiplication by a positive constant) from the budget constraints. Thus these equilibria are all unique.
IV Comparison with a more general theory
Drawing on the results of a more general theory of an exchange economy, as in e.g., in Mas-Colell and Zame (1991) and Araujo and Monteiro (1989) , based on proper preference relations (Mas-Colell (1986)), Aase (1993) formulated the following existence theorem for equilbibium in an exchange economy in L 
s., and such that E{(u i (V i )) 2 } < ∞ for all i, then there exists a quasiequilibrium.
If every member i brings something of value to the market, in that E(ξ · X i ) > 0 for all i, which seems like a reasonable assumption in most cases of interest, and is in fact one of our assumptions in Theorem 1, we have that a quasi-equilibrium is also an equilibrium, which then exists under the above stipulated conditions.
We notice that these requirements put joint restrictions on both preferences and probability distributions that are rather similar to the ones of Theorem 2. Although we have stronger requirements on the utility functions u i , our requirement on X M is weaker. In addition we also have demonstrated uniqueness of equilibrium. An example may illustrate the differences between the two theories:
Example 5. Consider the case of power utility of Example 4, where u i (x) = (x 1−a i − 1)/(1 − a i ) for x > 0, a i = 1. In this example the exponentially distributed Z i 's satisfy the assumptions of the allocation V in Theorem 4, and X M ∈ L 2 ++ since X M has a Gamma distribution. Provided E(ξ · X i ) > 0 for all i, an equilibrium will exist if
which holds true when a i < 1/2. As we demonstrated in Example 4, in the case where where a 1 = a 2 = . . . = a I := a, an equilibrium exists for I > 2a. Thus our previous result is stronger, or perhaps more relevant, since empirical studies suggest that the interesting values of a i may be in the range between one and 20, say.
Here it is simple to verify existence also when the parameters a i are unequal, and provided E(ξ · X i ) > 0 for all i, an equilibrium will exist in the region a i < 1/2 for all i according to the above theorem.
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In the case where all the d j,i are equal (to 1 I ), the initial portfolios all have the same Gamma (θI, I)-distribution, in which case the allocation X satisfy the requirements of the allocation V of Theorem 4. In this case we get existence in the region I > 2 max i {a i }, which is quite similar to the result of Example 4,  We see that the two theories give comparable results, albeit they guarantee existence in slightly different regions depending upon circumstances.
V Summary
Classical economics sought to explain the way markets coordinate the activities of many distinct individuals each acting in their own self-interest. An elegant synthesis of two hundred years of classical thought was achieved by the general equilibrium theory. The essential message of this theory is that when there are markets and associated prices for all goods and services in the economy, no externalities or public goods and no informational asymmetries or market power, then competitive markets allocate resources efficiently.
In this paper the idea of general equilibrium has been applied to a reinsurance syndicate, where many of the idealized conditions of the general theory may actually hold. The most critical assumption seems to be that of no informational asymmetries. Reinsurers like to stress that their transactions are carried out under conditions of "utmost good faith" -uberrima fides. This means that the reinsurers usually accept, without question, the direct insurer's estimate of the risk and settlement of claims. The mere existence of rating agencies in this industry is an indication that there may be both adverse selection, and also elements of moral hazard in these markets. Nevertheless, the above theory may still give a good picture of what goes on in syndicated markets.
In models of such markets properties of competitive equilibria have only academic interest so long as it is not clear under what conditions they exist. Uniqueness is clearly also an issue of great importance.
The advantage with the existence and uniqueness theorems of this paper is that they rest largely on results in risk theory, or the theory of syndicates, which implies that we may essentially restrict attention to the member weights in Euclidian I-dimensional space, thus reducing the dimensionality of the problems. In contrast Theorem 4 requires a rather demanding, infinite dimensional equilibrium theory.
certainly not linear.
